

Appendix 1

PWLB rates and forecast shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.

Capita Asset Services Interest Rate View														
	Dec-14	Mar-15	Jun-15	Sep-15	Dec-15	Mar-16	Jun-16	Sep-16	Dec-16	Mar-17	Jun-17	Sep-17	Dec-17	Mar-18
Bank Rate View	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	2.00%	2.25%	2.50%
3 Month LIBID	0.50%	0.60%	0.80%	0.90%	1.10%	1.30%	1.40%	1.60%	1.90%	2.10%	2.10%	2.30%	2.40%	2.60%
6 Month LIBID	0.70%	0.80%	1.00%	1.10%	1.20%	1.40%	1.50%	1.80%	2.00%	2.20%	2.30%	2.50%	2.70%	2.80%
12 Month LIBID	0.90%	1.00%	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.70%	1.80%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%	2.40%	2.60%	2.80%	3.00%
5yr PWLB Rate	2.50%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.50%	3.50%
10yr PWLB Rate	3.20%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.10%	4.20%	4.20%	4.30%	4.30%
25yr PWLB Rate	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.70%	4.80%	4.80%	4.90%	4.90%	5.00%
50yr PWLB Rate	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.70%	4.80%	4.80%	4.90%	4.90%	5.00%
Bank Rate														
Capita Asset Services	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	2.25%	2.25%	2.50%
Capital Economics	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	-	-	-	-	-
5yr PWLB Rate														
Capita Asset Services	2.50%	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.60%	3.70%
Capital Economics	2.60%	3.00%	3.30%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	-	-	-	-	-
10yr PWLB Rate														
Capita Asset Services	3.20%	3.40%	3.50%	3.60%	3.70%	3.80%	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.10%	4.20%	4.40%	4.40%	4.40%
Capital Economics	3.30%	3.50%	3.70%	3.85%	4.05%	4.15%	4.20%	4.25%	4.30%	-	-	-	-	-
25yr PWLB Rate														
Capita Asset Services	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.70%	4.80%	4.80%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%
Capital Economics	3.85%	4.05%	4.15%	4.25%	4.35%	4.40%	4.50%	4.55%	4.60%	-	-	-	-	-
50yr PWLB Rate														
Capita Asset Services	3.90%	4.00%	4.10%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.70%	4.80%	4.80%	5.00%	5.00%	5.00%
Capital Economics	3.90%	4.10%	4.20%	4.30%	4.40%	4.50%	4.60%	4.70%	4.80%	-	-	-	-	-

Minimum Revenue Provision Policy Statement 2015/16

The Council implemented the new Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) guidance in 2007/2008, and assessed MRP for 2007/2008 onwards in accordance with the main recommendations contained within the guidance issued by the Secretary of State under section 21(1A) of the Local Government Act 2003.

In setting the Minimum Revenue Provision Policy, Medway Council has regard to the guidance and will set a policy to ensure a prudent provision for the repayment of debt.

The major proportion of the MRP for 2015/16 will relate to the more historic debt liability that will continue to be charged at the rate of 4%, in accordance with option 1 of the guidance.

Certain expenditure reflected within the debt liability at 31 March 2015 will, under delegated powers be subject to MRP under option 3, which will be charged over a period which is reasonably commensurate with the estimated useful life applicable to the nature of expenditure, using the equal annual instalment method (or annuity method if appropriate). For example, capital expenditure on a new building, or on the refurbishment or enhancement of a building, will be related to the estimated life of that building.

The Council will treat all expenditures as not ranking for MRP until the year after the scheme or asset to which they relate is completed and/or brought into use, rather than confine this approach solely to expenditures treated for MRP purposes under Option 3

Estimated life periods will be determined under delegated powers. To the extent that expenditure is not on the creation of an asset and is of a type that is subject to estimated life periods that are referred to in the guidance, these periods will generally be adopted by the Council. However, the Council reserves the right to determine useful life periods and prudent MRP in exceptional circumstances where the recommendations of the guidance would not be appropriate.

As some types of capital expenditure incurred by the Council are not capable of being related to an individual asset, asset lives will be assessed on a basis which most reasonably reflects the anticipated period of benefit that arises from the expenditure. Also, whatever type of expenditure is involved, it will be grouped together in a manner which reflects the nature of the main component of expenditure and will only be divided up in cases where there are two or more major components with substantially different useful economic lives.

In the case of long term debtors arising from loans or other types of capital expenditure made by the Council which will be repaid under separate arrangements (such as long term investments), or where borrowing has occurred but will be repaid by future Capital Receipts or agreed income from other source, there will be no Minimum Revenue Provision made.

There is no requirement on the HRA to make a minimum revenue provision

Prudential and Treasury Indicators

TABLE 3: Prudential indicators	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Extract from budget and rent setting reports	estimate	estimate	estimate
	£'000	£'000	£'000
Capital Expenditure			
Non - HRA	22,966	3336	1643
HRA	8071	7935	4464
TOTAL	31,037	13,168	25,717
Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream			
Non - HRA	2.92%	3.06%	3.09%
HRA (applies only to housing authorities)	17.66%	18.38%	18.59%
Gross borrowing requirement			
brought forward 1 April	164,103	168,103	168,103
carried forward 31 March	168,103	168,103	168,103
in year borrowing requirement	4,000	0	0
In year Capital Financing Requirement			
Non - HRA	-9,873	-2,360	-1,590
HRA (applies only to housing authorities)	3,014	2,395	-899
TOTAL	-6,859	35	-2,489
Capital Financing Requirement as at 31 March			
Non - HRA	199,484	197,124	195,533
HRA (applies only to housing authorities)	42,530	44,926	44,027
TOTAL	242,014	242,049	239,560
Incremental impact of capital investment decisions	£ p	£ p	
Increase in Council Tax (band D) per annum *	£0.82	-£4.98	-£0.51
Increase in average housing rent per week (housing authorities only)	£0.11	£1.48	£0.82

* or increase in precept for police, fire and other authorities

TABLE 4: Treasury management indicators	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
	estimate	estimate	estimate
	£'000	£'000	£'000
Authorised Limit for external debt -			
borrowing	420,285	418,561	414,131
other long term liabilities	4,400	4,400	4,400
TOTAL	424,685	422,961	418,531
Operational Boundary for external debt -			
borrowing	382,077	380,510	376,482
other long term liabilities	4,000	4,000	4,000
TOTAL	386,077	384,510	380,482
Actual external debt	168,103	168,103	168,103
HRA Maximum CFR Debt Limit	45,846	45,846	45,846
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure			
Net principal re fixed rate borrowing / investments	100%	100%	100%
Upper limit for variable rate exposure			
Net principal re variable rate borrowing / investments	40%	40%	40%
Upper limit for total principal sums invested for over 364 days (per maturity date)	150,000	150,000	150,000

TABLE 5: Maturity structure of new fixed rate borrowing during 2014/15	Actual 2014/15	Upper Limit	Lower Limit
under 12 months	25%	75%	0%
12 months and within 24 months	13%	50%	0%
24 months and within 5 years	25%	50%	0%
5 years and within 10 years	9%	50%	0%
10 years and above	28%	100%	0%

Economic Background

UK

Strong UK GDP quarterly **growth** of 0.7%, 0.8% and 0.7% in quarters 2, 3 and 4 respectively in 2013, (2013 annual rate 2.7%), and 0.7% in Q1, 0.9% in Q2 and a first estimate of 0.7% in Q3 2014 (annual rate 3.1% in Q3), means that the UK will have the strongest rate of growth of any G7 country in 2014. It also appears very likely that strong growth will continue through the second half of 2014 and into 2015 as forward surveys for the services and construction sectors are very encouraging and business investment is also strongly recovering. The manufacturing sector has also been encouraging though recent figures indicate a weakening in the future trend rate of growth. However, for this recovery to become more balanced and sustainable in the longer term, the recovery needs to move away from dependence on consumer expenditure and the housing market to exporting, and particularly of manufactured goods, both of which need to substantially improve on their recent lacklustre performance.

This overall strong growth has resulted in **unemployment** falling much faster through the initial threshold of 7%, set by the **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)** last August, before it said it would consider any increases in Bank Rate. The MPC has, therefore, subsequently broadened its forward guidance by adopting five qualitative principles and looking at a much wider range of about eighteen indicators in order to form a view on how much slack there is in the economy and how quickly slack is being used up. The MPC is particularly concerned that the current squeeze on the disposable incomes of consumers should be reversed by wage inflation rising back above the level of inflation in order to ensure that the recovery will be sustainable. There also needs to be a major improvement in labour productivity, which has languished at dismal levels since 2008, to support increases in pay rates. Most economic forecasters are expecting growth to peak in 2014 and then to ease off a little, though still remaining strong, in 2015 and 2016. Unemployment is therefore expected to keep on its downward trend and this is likely to eventually feed through into a return to significant increases in pay rates at some point during the next three years. However, just how much those future increases in pay rates will counteract the depressive effect of increases in Bank Rate on consumer confidence, the rate of growth in consumer expenditure and the buoyancy of the housing market, are areas that will need to be kept under regular review.

Also encouraging has been the sharp fall in **inflation** (CPI) during 2014 after being consistently above the MPC's 2% target between December 2009 and December 2013. Inflation fell to 1.2% in September, a five year low. Forward indications are that inflation is likely to fall further in 2014 to possibly near to 1% and then to remain near to, or under, the 2% target level over the MPC's two year ahead time horizon. Overall, markets are expecting that the MPC will be cautious in raising **Bank Rate** as it will want to protect heavily indebted consumers from too early an increase in Bank Rate at a time when inflationary pressures are also weak. A first increase in Bank Rate is therefore expected in Q2 2015 and they expect increases after that to be at a slow pace to lower levels than prevailed before 2008 as increases in Bank Rate will have a much bigger effect on heavily indebted consumers than they did before 2008.

The return to strong growth has also helped lower forecasts for the increase in **Government debt** by £73bn over the next five years, as announced in the 2013 Autumn Statement, and by an additional £24bn, as announced in the March 2014 Budget - which also forecast a return to a significant budget surplus, (of £5bn), in 2018-19. However, monthly public sector deficit figures have disappointed so far in 2014/15.

The Eurozone (EZ)

The Eurozone is facing an increasing threat from weak or negative growth and from deflation. In September, the inflation rate fell further, to reach a low of 0.3%. However, this is an average for all EZ countries and includes some countries with negative rates of inflation. Accordingly, the ECB took some rather limited action in June to loosen monetary policy in order to promote growth. In September it took further action to cut its benchmark rate to only 0.05%, its deposit rate to -0.2% and to start a programme of purchases of corporate debt. However, it has not embarked yet on full quantitative easing (purchase of sovereign debt).

Concern in financial markets for the Eurozone subsided considerably during 2013. However, sovereign debt difficulties have not gone away and major issues could return in respect of any countries that do not dynamically address fundamental issues of low growth, international uncompetitiveness and the need for overdue reforms of the economy, (as Ireland has done). It is, therefore, possible over the next few years that levels of government debt to GDP ratios could continue to rise for some countries. This could mean that sovereign debt concerns have not disappeared but, rather, have only been postponed. The ECB's pledge in 2012 to buy unlimited amounts of bonds of countries which ask for a bailout has provided heavily indebted countries with a strong defence against market forces. This has bought them time to make progress with their economies to return to growth or to reduce the degree of recession. However, debt to GDP ratios (2013 figures) of Greece 180%, Italy 133%, Portugal 129%, Ireland 124% and Cyprus 112%, remain a cause of concern, especially as some of these countries are experiencing continuing rates of increase in debt in excess of their rate of economic growth i.e. these debt ratios are likely to continue to deteriorate. Any sharp downturn in economic growth would make these countries particularly vulnerable to a new bout of sovereign debt crisis. It should also be noted that Italy has the third biggest debt mountain in the world behind Japan and the US. Greece remains particularly vulnerable but has made good progress in reducing its annual budget deficit and in returning, at last, to marginal economic growth. Whilst a Greek exit from the Euro is now improbable in the short term, some commentators still view the inevitable end game as either being another major right off of debt or an eventual exit.

There are also particular concerns as to whether democratically elected governments will lose the support of electorates suffering under EZ imposed austerity programmes, especially in countries like Greece and Spain which have unemployment rates of over 24% and unemployment among younger people of over 50 – 60%. There are also major concerns as to whether the governments of France and Italy will effectively implement austerity programmes and undertake overdue reforms to improve national competitiveness. Any loss of market confidence in the two largest Eurozone economies after Germany would present a huge challenge to the resources of the ECB to defend their debt.

USA

The Federal Reserve started to reduce its monthly asset purchases of \$85bn in December 2013 by \$10bn per month; these ended in October 2014, signalling confidence the US economic recovery would remain on track. First quarter GDP figures for the US were depressed by exceptionally bad winter weather, but growth rebounded very strongly in Q2 to 4.6% (annualised). The first estimate of Q3 showed growth of 3.5% (annualised). Annual growth during 2014 is likely to be just over 2%.

The U.S. faces similar debt problems to those of the UK, but thanks to reasonable growth, cuts in government expenditure and tax rises, the annual government deficit has been halved from its peak without appearing to do too much damage to growth, although the weak labour force participation rate remains a matter of key concern for the Federal Reserve when considering the amount of slack in the economy and monetary policy decisions. It is currently expected that the Fed. will start increasing rates in mid 2015.

China

Government action in 2014 to stimulate the economy appeared to be putting the target of 7.5% growth within achievable reach but recent data has been mixed. There are also concerns that the Chinese leadership have only started to address an unbalanced economy which is heavily dependent on new investment expenditure, and for a potential bubble in the property sector to burst, as it did in Japan in the 1990s, with its consequent impact on the financial health of the banking sector. There are also concerns around the potential size, and dubious creditworthiness, of some bank lending to local government organisations and major corporates. This primarily occurred during the government promoted expansion of credit, which was aimed at protecting the overall rate of growth in the economy after the Lehmans crisis.

Japan

Japan is causing considerable concern as the increase in sales tax in April 2014 has suppressed consumer expenditure and growth. In Q2 growth was -1.8% q/q and -7.1% over the previous year. The Government is hoping that this is a temporary blip.

CAPITA ASSET SERVICES FORWARD VIEW

Economic forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. Major volatility in bond yields is likely to endure as investor fears and confidence ebb and flow between favouring more risky assets i.e. equities, or the safe haven of bonds.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, due to the high volume of gilt issuance in the UK, and of bond issuance in other major western countries. Over time, an increase in investor confidence in world economic recovery is also likely to compound this effect as recovery will further encourage investors to switch from bonds to equities.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is currently evenly weighted. However, only time will tell just how long this period of strong economic growth will last; it also remains exposed to vulnerabilities in a number of key areas.

The interest rate forecasts in this report are based on an initial assumption that there will not be a major resurgence of the EZ debt crisis, or a break-up of the EZ, but rather that there will be a managed, albeit painful and tortuous, resolution of the debt crisis where EZ institutions and governments eventually do what is necessary - but only when all else has been tried and failed. Under this assumed scenario, growth within the EZ will be tepid for the next couple of years and some EZ countries experiencing low or negative growth, will, over that time period, see an increase in total government debt to GDP ratios. There is a significant danger that these ratios could rise to the point where markets lose confidence in the financial viability of one, or more, countries, especially if growth disappoints and / or efforts to reduce government deficits fail to deliver the necessary reductions. However, it is impossible to forecast whether any individual country will lose such confidence, or when, and so precipitate a sharp resurgence of the EZ debt crisis. While the ECB has adequate resources to manage a debt crisis in a small EZ country, if one, or more, of the large countries were to experience a major crisis of market confidence, this would present a serious challenge to the ECB and to EZ politicians.

Downside risks currently include:

- The situation over Ukraine poses a major threat to EZ and world growth if it was to deteriorate into economic warfare between the West and Russia where Russia resorted to using its control over gas supplies to Europe.
- Fears generated by the potential impact of Ebola around the world
- UK strong economic growth is currently mainly dependent on consumer spending and the potentially unsustainable boom in the housing market. The boost from these sources is likely to fade after 2014.
- A weak rebalancing of UK growth to exporting and business investment causing a weakening of overall economic growth beyond 2014.
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partner - the EU, inhibiting economic recovery in the UK.
- A return to weak economic growth in the US, UK and China causing major disappointment in investor and market expectations.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis caused by ongoing deterioration in government debt to GDP ratios to the point where financial markets lose confidence in the financial viability of one or more countries and in the ability of the ECB and Eurozone governments to deal with the potential size of the crisis.
- Recapitalisation of European banks requiring considerable government financial support.
- Lack of support by populaces in Eurozone countries for austerity programmes, especially in countries with very high unemployment rates e.g. Greece and Spain, which face huge challenges in engineering economic growth to correct their budget deficits on a sustainable basis.
- Italy: the political situation has improved but it remains to be seen whether the new government is able to deliver the austerity programme required and a

programme of overdue reforms. Italy has the third highest government debt mountain in the world.

- France: after being elected on an anti austerity platform, President Hollande has embraced a €50bn programme of public sector cuts over the next three years. However, there could be major obstacles in implementing this programme. Major overdue reforms of employment practices and an increase in competitiveness are also urgently required to lift the economy out of stagnation.
- Monetary policy action failing to stimulate sustainable growth in western economies, especially the Eurozone and Japan.
- Heightened political risks in the Middle East and East Asia could trigger safe haven flows back into bonds.
- There are also increasing concerns at the reluctance of western central banks to raise interest rates significantly for some years, plus the huge QE measures which remain in place (and may be added to by the ECB in the near future). This has created potentially unstable flows of liquidity searching for yield and, therefore, heightened the potential for an increase in risks in order to get higher returns. This is a return to a similar environment to the one which led to the 2008 financial crisis.

The potential for upside risks to UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- A further surge in investor confidence that robust world economic growth is firmly expected, causing a flow of funds out of bonds into equities.

UK inflation returning to significantly higher levels than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

Specified and Non-Specified Investments

SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS:

(All such investments will be sterling denominated, with **maturities up to maximum of 1 year**, meeting the minimum 'high' rating criteria where applicable)

	* Minimum 'High' Credit Criteria	Use
Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility	--	In-house
Term deposits – local authorities	--	In-house
Term deposits – banks and building societies	See note 1	In-house
Collateralised deposit (see note 3)	UK sovereign rating	In-house
Certificates of deposit issued by banks and building societies	See note 1 and 2	In-house
UK Government Gilts	UK sovereign rating	In-house buy and hold and Fund Manager
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	In-house buy and hold
Bond issuance issued by a financial institution which is explicitly guaranteed by the UK Government (refers solely to GEFCO - Guaranteed Export Finance Corporation)	UK sovereign rating	In-house buy and hold
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK govt)	AAA	In-house buy and hold
Treasury Bills	UK sovereign rating	In house
Government Liquidity Funds	* Long-term AAA volatility rating V1+	In-house
Money Market Funds	* Long-term AAA volatility rating V1+	In-house

Note 1. Award of "Creditworthiness" Colour by Capita Asset Services as detailed in paragraph 14.11.2

Accounting treatment of investments. The accounting treatment may differ from the underlying cash transactions arising from investment decisions made by this Council. To ensure that the Council is protected from any adverse revenue impact, which may arise from these differences, we will review the accounting implications of new transactions before they are undertaken.

NON-SPECIFIED INVESTMENTS

These are any investments which do not meet the Specified Investment criteria. A maximum of 70% ** will be held in aggregate in non-specified investment

1. Maturities of ANY period

	* Minimum Credit Criteria	Use	** Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities: -Structured deposits	See note 1	In-house	£10m	Lower of 5 years or Capita Asset Services duration rating

2. Maturities in excess of 1 year

	* Minimum Credit Criteria	Use	** Max % of total investments	Max. maturity period
Term deposits – local authorities	--	In-house	40%	5 Years
Term deposits – banks and building societies	See note 1	In-house	40%	As per Capita Asset Services duration rating
Certificates of deposit issued by banks and building societies covered by UK Government (explicit) guarantee	See note 1 and 2	In-house	40%	As per Capita Asset Services duration rating
Certificates of deposit issued by banks and building societies	See note 1 and 2	In-house	40%	As per Capita Asset Services duration rating
UK Government Gilts	UK sovereign rating	In-house and Fund Manager	40% In-house 100% Fund Manager	In-house see note 1,
Bonds issued by multilateral development banks	AAA	In-house	20% in-house	In-house see note 1,
Sovereign bond issues (other than the UK govt)	AAA	In-house	20% in-house	In-house see note 1

Note 1. Award of “Creditworthiness” Colour by Capita Asset Services as detailed in paragraph 14.11.2

** If forward deposits are to be made, the forward period plus the deal period should not exceed one year in aggregate.

N.B. buy and hold may also include sale at a financial year end and repurchase the following day in order to accommodate the requirements of SORP.

Approved Countries for Investments

Based on lowest available rating

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Finland
- Hong Kong
- Netherlands
- U.K.
- U.S.A.

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- Qatar

AA-

- Belgium
- Saudi Arabia

The Treasury Management Role Of The Section 151 Officer

The S151 (responsible) officer

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.

Scrutiny of Treasury Management

1. Audit Committee – terms of reference

- To provide independent assurance on the adequacy of the risk management framework and the associated control environment, including consideration of the Council's approach to risk management and the assurance framework, the production of the annual governance statement, arrangements for delivering value for money and the Council's anti-fraud arrangements and anti-corruption measures;
- To receive reports in line with the Council's whistleblowing, anti-bribery, covert surveillance policies and anti-money laundering policies;
- To monitor the Council's compliance with its own published standards and to consider any proposals for changes to Financial Rules, Codes of Practice on tenders and contracts;
- To monitor financial policies and processes, including endorsement of improvement plans to strengthen the control environment;
- To approve the annual governance statement;
- To approve the annual accounts;
- To scrutinise the Council's treasury management, investment strategy, minimum revenue provision policy statement along with treasury management practices and associated schedules and approve the annual treasury outturn;
- To discuss with the external auditor new accounting standards, changes to the reporting framework and the basis of the annual audit, including the content of performance work;
- To receive all reports by the external auditor including all performance reports and the annual audit and inspection letter;
- To oversee Internal Audit activity;
- To monitor the effectiveness of Internal Audit
- To provide an independent review of the Council's financial and non-financial performance

2. Financial Rules

- 7.1 (e) The Chief Finance Officer shall report to the Audit Committee, Cabinet and Council before the start of the new financial year on borrowing and investment strategies for the ensuing year and to Cabinet and Audit Committee not later than September on treasury management activities in the previous year.

- 7.2 (f) Council nominates Audit Committee to be responsible for ensuring effective scrutiny of the treasury management strategy policies

Diversity Impact Assessment: Screening Form

Directorate BSD	Name of Function or Policy or Major Service Change Treasury Management Strategy		
Officer responsible for assessment Jonathan Lloyd	Date of assessment 7/1/2015	New or existing? Existing	
Defining what is being assessed			
1. Briefly describe the purpose and objectives	The Treasury Management Strategy, is the strategy that the Council applies to effectively manage it's Treasury Function. This is defined by CIPFA as <i>The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.</i>		
2. Who is intended to benefit, and in what way?	All stakeholders with a safe and effective Treasury Management Strategy		
3. What outcomes are wanted?	The successful and secure management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.		
4. What factors/forces could contribute/detract from the outcomes?	<u>Contribute</u> Effective Strategy, Good planning Effective use of information and intelligence	<u>Detract</u> Resources, Further cuts	
5. Who are the main stakeholders?	The Chief Finance Officer, Full Council and residents		
6. Who implements this and who is responsible?	Chief Finance Officer, and the Treasury Team		

Assessing impact		
7. Are there concerns that there <u>could</u> be a differential impact due to <i>racial/ethnic groups</i>?	YES	Brief statement of main issue
	NO	
What evidence exists for this?	The Treasury Management Strategy does not directly impact on members of the public as it deals with the Treasury management functions of the authority. Decisions are based upon the principles highlighted within the Strategy and have no impact on any one particular group. Hence there will not be a differential impact due racial or ethnic group membership.	
8. Are there concerns that there <u>could</u> be a differential impact due to <i>disability</i>?	YES	Brief statement of main issue
	NO	
What evidence exists for this?	The Treasury Management Strategy does not directly impact on members of the public as it deals with the Treasury management functions of the authority. Decisions are based upon the principles highlighted within the Strategy and have no impact on any one particular group. Hence there will not be a differential impact due disability.	
9. Are there concerns that there <u>could</u> be a differential impact due to <i>gender</i>?	YES	Brief statement of main issue
	NO	
What evidence exists for this?	The Treasury Management Strategy does not directly impact on members of the public as it deals with the Treasury management functions of the authority. Decisions are based upon the principles highlighted within the Strategy and have no impact on any one particular group. Hence there will not be a differential impact due gender.	
10. Are there concerns there <u>could</u> be a differential impact due to <i>sexual orientation</i>?	YES	Brief statement of main issue
	NO	
What evidence exists for this?	The Treasury Management Strategy does not directly impact on members of the public as it deals with the Treasury management functions of the authority. Decisions are based upon the principles highlighted within the Strategy and have no impact on any one particular group. Hence there will not be a differential impact due sexual orientation.	
11. Are there concerns there <u>could</u> be a have a differential impact due to <i>religion or belief</i>?	YES	Brief statement of main issue
	NO	
What evidence exists for this?	The Treasury Management Strategy does not directly impact on members of the public as it	

	deals with the Treasury management functions of the authority. Decisions are based upon the principles highlighted within the Strategy and have no impact on any one particular group. Hence there will not be a differential impact due religion or belief.	
12. Are there concerns there <u>could</u> be a differential impact due to people's age?	YES	Brief statement of main issue
	NO	
What evidence exists for this?	The Treasury Management Strategy does not directly impact on members of the public as it deals with the Treasury management functions of the authority. Decisions are based upon the principles highlighted within the Strategy and have no impact on any one particular group. Hence there will not be a differential impact due to people's age.	
13. Are there concerns that there <u>could</u> be a differential impact due to <i>being trans-gendered or transsexual</i>?	YES	Brief statement of main issue
	NO	
What evidence exists for this?	The Treasury Management Strategy does not directly impact on members of the public as it deals with the Treasury management functions of the authority. Decisions are based upon the principles highlighted within the Strategy and have no impact on any one particular group. Hence there will not be a differential impact due an individual's gender identity.	
14. Are there any <i>other</i> groups that would find it difficult to access/make use of the function (e.g. speakers of other languages; people with caring responsibilities or dependants; those with an offending past; or people living in rural areas)?	YES	If yes, which group(s)?
	NO	
What evidence exists for this?	The Treasury Management Strategy does not directly impact on members of the public as it deals with the Treasury management functions of the authority. Decisions are based upon the principles highlighted within the Strategy and have no impact on any one particular group. Hence there will not be a differential impact.	
15. Are there concerns there <u>could</u> be a have a differential impact due to <i>multiple discriminations</i> (e.g. disability <u>and</u> age)?	YES	Brief statement of main issue
	NO	
What evidence exists for this?	The Treasury Management Strategy does not directly impact on members of the public as it deals with the Treasury management functions of the authority. Decisions are based upon the principles highlighted within the Strategy and have no impact on any one particular group. Hence there will not be a differential impact.	

Conclusions & recommendation		
16. Could the differential impacts identified in questions 7-15 amount to there being the potential for adverse impact?	YES	Brief statement of main issue
	NO	
17. Can the adverse impact be justified on the grounds of promoting equality of opportunity for one group? Or another reason?	YES	Please explain
	NO	
Recommendation to proceed to a full impact assessment?		
NO	This function/ policy/ service change complies with the requirements of the legislation and there is evidence to show this is the case.	
NO, BUT ...	What is required to ensure this complies with the requirements of the legislation? (see DIA Guidance Notes)?	Minor modifications necessary (e.g. change of 'he' to 'he or she', re-analysis of way routine statistics are reported)
YES	Give details of key person responsible and target date for carrying out full impact assessment (see DIA Guidance Notes)	

Action plan to make Minor modifications		
Outcome	Actions (with date of completion)	Officer responsible

Planning ahead: Reminders for the next review		
Date of next review	January 2016	
Areas to check at next review (e.g. new census information, new legislation due)		
Is there <i>another</i> group (e.g. new communities) that is relevant and ought to be considered next time?		
Signed (completing officer/service manager) Jonathan Lloyd	Date	7/1/2015
Signed (service manager/Assistant Director) Mick Hayward	Date	7/1/2015